In this paper, interpretation and application dispute settlement provisions of European Union (EU) Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) signed between 1963 and 2006 are analysed. This will be through the two models of Dispute Settlement in International Law: the political and adjudicative. Political elements of dispute settlement mechanisms in Public International Law and General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) served to establish those of the EU FTAs. Adjudicative and quasi-adjudicative elements of dispute settlement mechanisms of Public International Law and World Trade Organization (WTO) Law were used as parameters to set up those of the EU FTAs. These parameters also helped to define a new and unique hybrid model. The features of this model were found in Agreements with trade issues other than FTAs. It is possible, however, for future FTAs to incorporate them. The hybrid model is based on an adjudicative framework and includes both political and adjudicative elements. In conclusion, it was found that even though WTO Members incorporated adjudicative elements in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the EU did not incorporate them bilaterally for a further five years. Furthermore, since the creation of the DSU in 1995, the EU has established more FTAs based on a political model than on a quasi-adjudicative. Consequently, the quasi-adjudicative dispute settlement model has not represented a clear trend in EU FTAs.
INTRODUCTION
This paper explores whether the EU has followed the trend set by the WTO DSU in adopting a quasi-adjudicative dispute settlement model in its FTAs. 1 It will point out that the quasi-adjudicative model of the DSU influenced dispute settlement provisions in the EU FTAs' until 2000 when the EU-Mexico FTA entered into force.
Public International Law differentiates between political and adjudicative peaceful dispute settlement means. 2 This division is supported by two criteria; the first is the political or legal basis in which the actors use to solve their disputes. The second is whether or not the decision is binding and definitive. 3 According to the principle of "free choice of means", the parties can use these means to solve their disputes by creating their own mechanisms.
The nature of these mechanisms can be either political or adjudicative, or a combination of both (i.e. quasi-adjudicative). 5 In the field of Public International Trade Law, at a multilateral level, the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the GATT 6 designed procedures to solve their disputes. Between 1947 and 1994, the political elements of these provisions evolved towards adjudication. During this time, States also bilaterally designed their own mechanisms to solve disputes of interpretation and application in their FTAs. 7 In 1995, with the creation of the WTO, a new quasi-adjudicative dispute settlement system was born, i.e. the DSU. The DSU influenced many countries to include quasi-adjudicative models of dispute settlement into their FTAs. 8 It took, however, a further five years before the EU adopted a similar position.
For almost 40 years the EU included political dispute settlement models in its FTAs. Then, in 2000, a quasi-adjudicative dispute settlement model was introduced through the EUMexico FTA. This paper chronologically analyses dispute settlement models of EU FTAs. It explores their evolution from 1963 until the present day negotiations. Furthermore, it classifies EU FTAs as either political or quasi-adjudicative through their dispute settlement models. Lastly, it creates a new classification for a dispute settlement model which is found in Agreements with different levels of economic integration other than FTAs. Due to its adjudicative framework composed of political and adjudicative elements, this paper defines this classification as a hybrid model. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to identify whether or not the quasi-adjudicative model marked a particular trend or if it should be considered as just another model.
In addition to the introduction, conclusion and references, this article is divided into six chapters. The first recognizes the main characteristics of a political dispute settlement model in Public International Law and GATT Law. The second identifies the political dispute settlement model in EU FTAs signed before and after the WTO was established. The third analyses Public International Law and WTO adjudicative elements of their dispute settlement models. The fourth examines the EU FTAs' quasi-adjudicative model of dispute settlement. The fifth defines a hybrid model of dispute settlement in EU Agreements with trade issues. The sixth identifies the not yet in force EU FTAs that are currently under negotiation. 5 For more on procedures of international instruments that differ from the United Nations See Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (New York, United Nations, 1992), pp.135-154. 6 With the establishment of the WTO, the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the GATT became Members of the WTO. 7 For the purpose of this article, only interpretation and application provisions of Dispute Settlement in Free Trade Agreements are going to be explored. Provisions of dispute settlement of trade defence measures are not going to be taken into account. 8 Canada, United States and Mexico are examples of dispute settlement provisions which are incorporated in Chapter XX of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
I. POLITICAL MODELS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

Political model of dispute settlement in Public International Law
This section explores the main elements of a political model of dispute settlement in Public International Law. This model is derived from the peaceful dispute settlement means stated in the United Nations Charter, Article 33. The following means are considered political: negotiation, inquiry, mediation and conciliation. 9 Additionally, good offices 10 and consultations 11 are also considered as part of this group. 12 All of these means have their own particular elements. For example, while negotiation is directly in between the parties, for inquiry, mediation and conciliation a third authority intervenes. This is also illustrated when in inquiry, mediation and conciliation a third authority proposes a solution, however, in negotiation this is not possible. Also, while in negotiation and mediation there are no rules of procedure, in inquiry and conciliation there are pre-established rules of procedure, etc.).
This paper will stress the two elements which are common to all. The first is the option for the Parties to solve their disputes without a legal basis through political opportunity. The second is that the issued recommendation becomes compulsory only if the Parties involved agree on it. 13 Consequently, if these elements are included in a dispute settlement mechanism, it will be considered as a political model of dispute settlement in Public International Law (as illustrated in diagram 1): 9 For a deeper knowledge of each one of these means, See Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (New York, United Nations, 1992), pp. 9-55; J. G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, supra (note 2), pp.1-87; A. Remiro Brotons y R.M. Riquelme Cortado, J. Diez-Hochleitner, E. Orihuela Calatayud y L. Pérez-Prat Durbán, Derecho Internacional, supra (note 2), p.864. 10 In the Manila Chart, good offices are added to the group of peaceful dispute settlement means. See Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (New York, United Nations, 1992), supra (note 9), p. 7. 11 Consultations are considered a type of negotiation which have the added value of giving Parties the possibility of gathering information before the dispute starts. See J. G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, supra (note 2), pp. 3-8. 12 See Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States, supra (note 9), p. 10. 13 See supra (note 2).
Diagram 1. Political Model of Dispute Settlement in Public International Law
Signatory Parties to International Agreements agree on peaceful means as is appropriate to the circumstances and the nature of their dispute.
14 Due to the Public International Law principle of free choice of means 15 , countries have designed their own mechanisms to solve disputes. Trade is one of the fields in which the Parties have designed mechanisms at both a multilateral level, as in the GATT and WTO, and at a bilateral level, as in the FTAs.
Political model of dispute settlement in GATT Law (1947 to 1994)
In the GATT, between 1947 and 1994, disputes were solved using Articles XXII and XXIII which regulate the consultations and the nullification or impairment of a benefit respectively. 16 The disputes were dealt within the framework of working parties. 17 Later on, for cases when the dispute was not solved through consultative procedures, they also agreed 14 See Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States, supra (note 9), p. 7. 15 Article 33 paragraph one of the Charter of the United Nations. 16 For a deeper analysis of the preparatory work and the survey of practice and procedures of these two articles See J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT (USA, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1969), pp.166-187. 17 Working parties were small groups of government representatives with a direct interest in the dispute (i.e. in finding a settlement, since they each represented the complainant, the defendant and other governments likely to be affected by the outcome). They were groups designed for political exchange and negotiation and had no third-party decision making power. Despite its consultative nature, the working party was invested with adjudicatory power. This was the case when the United States asked a working party for an "advisory ruling" to find whether or not Canada's agricultural trade restrictions violated Article XI. The neutral members of the working party (excluding the United States) answered some legal questions but refused to rule on the key issue. See R. Hudec The GATT panel procedures had weaknesses which were eliminated and replaced with adjudicative elements. This section reviews these panel procedures with the aim of identifying the weaknesses of the GATT dispute settlement provisions during these years (1947 to 1994) . Through these weaknesses it will be possible to recognize the political model of dispute settlement used in the multilateral trading system.
In the GATT 1947, CONTRACTING PARTIES 20 solved their own disputes by making decisions on a technical, diplomatic and political basis. 21 In 1950 a working party was constituted to investigate one of the earliest complaints. 22 In 1952 they built up a panel procedure 23 which was adopted in 1958. 24 This panel procedure was informal, with vague rulings where the judges and complainants were diplomats and not practising lawyers. 25 From the second decade (1960) both the CONTRACTING PARTIES and the policy agenda changed. 26 Many modifications towards legalism occurred in the GATT dispute settlement provisions. 27 18 The differences between the composition and the working methods between the panel on complaints and those of the working party are established in a Note by the Executive Secretary, GATT Doc. L/392/Rev. 27 For example, in 1962 a panel ruled in the Uruguayan recourse to Article XXII that, if is demonstrated that there is a prima facie violation of any provision of the GATT, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent. Later on, the CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted the Decision of 5 April 1966 which sets out procedures intended to facilitate the complaints of developing countries against developed countries. See J. Lacarte and F. Pierola, "Comparing the WTO and GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: What was accomplished in the Uruguay Round?", supra (note 21), pp. 36-38. At the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979, the CONTRACTING PARTIES created an Understanding of dispute settlement procedures and practices (Understanding 1979). The Understanding 1979 established some stages in the procedure, i.e. notification, consultation, good offices, establishment and composition of panels, third party rights, right of panels to get information, nature and content of panel reports, desirability of prompt action (for panels and CONTRACTING PARTIES), surveillance, and technical cooperation for developing countries. 28 It also declared that the aim of the GATT dispute settlement system favoured a mutually acceptable solution.
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In the Ministerial Declaration of 1982, the EC led the confirmation of the principle of political commitment (or consensus principle) in the Understanding 1979. This principle articulated that the traditional rights of Parties should participate in consensus decisions. In other words, it allowed the adoption of panel rulings and the authorization of retaliation to be blocked. 30 Thus, the CONTRACTING PARTIES only agreed on establishing rules for alternative dispute settlement mechanisms, panel mandates and panel conclusions. Furthermore, the rules for surveillance and compensation were reinforced. 31 These improvements were part of a rule based dispute settlement procedure which, because of the possibility of blockage, was considered by some authors as only modestly effective. 32 In 1984 the CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted a decision regarding the selection of panel members. 33 This decision contained a roster from governments with qualified individuals to become panel members, an indicative list of non-governmental experts and the right of the Director General to name panel members from the non-governmental roster within 30 days. 34 In addition, the panel members had the possibility of determining their own working procedures. In the dispute settlement negotiations of the Uruguay Round 36 , a central question needed to be answered: should the dispute settlement procedure retain the requirement of consensus in decision making? 37 The CONTRACTING PARTIES wanted to retain the power of veto essentially in two Council decisions. The first adopted a panel ruling (making it legally binding) and the second authorized retaliation. Thus, in 1989 the CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted the Midterm Agreement which maintained the consensus principle. 38 Moreover, they established most of the timeframes and default procedures in some stages of panel work. 39 At the end of 1980, the GATT dispute settlement mechanism saw the increase of two opposing tendencies, i.e. binding and stronger vs. political commitment. 40 Some authors have pointed to the procedural weaknesses of the panel procedure as the primary cause of the GATT's difficulties with dispute settlement. 41 For the purpose of this article, these weaknesses are classified into different groups and are considered the elements of the political model of dispute settlement in the GATT (1947 to 1994). The three elements are: no final decisions, decision making process under consensus and no preestablished or barely detailed legal stages.
a) No final decisions
i) During the first decade of the GATT, the resolutions were not final because they were made by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on a political instead of a legal basis. 42 ii) Additionally the resolutions were pragmatic, on a case by case basis and they did not refer to past decisions or serve as a projection for future ones. iii) A lack of time frames. Before 1989, timeframes were not included in the dispute settlement provisions. iv) A lack of pre-established procedures. 44 In 1989 some procedures of the panel work were established by default.
When some or all political model elements are included in a dispute settlement mechanism of International Trade, a political model is formed (see table 1). At the end of 1991, the Uruguay Round negotiators drafted a new reform proposal which was named Understanding on Dispute Settlement. 45 It encompassed everything relating to the process of gathering the amendments made to the GATT (i.e. 1979 GATT (i.e. , 1982 GATT (i.e. , 1984 GATT (i.e. and 1989 ). The two main contributions were the elimination of the consensus principle of some decisions in the decision making process and the incorporation of an appellate stage. 46 After this lengthy process, in 1995, the CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted this proposal as one of the WTO Agreements and called it Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The DSU removed most of the political elements of the GATT (1947 to 1994) and strengthen it by replacing them with adjudicative elements.
In the multilateral trade arena, the EU has been the main opponent of the development of a dispute settlement mechanism with adjudicative elements. At the same time, the EU has designed dispute settlement provisions at a bilateral level. The following chapter examines these provisions in order to determine when the EU adopted steps to strengthen its bilateral dispute settlement provisions.
II. POLITICAL MODEL OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
The classification of signed Agreements by the EU 47 with third countries is varied and mostly depends upon the chosen parameters. The most common classification divides the Agreements according to the level of integration that is intended with the third country. Over the years it has evolved 48 into the following classifications: Association Agreements, Partnership Cooperation and Development Agreements or Agreements solely for Trade interests by matters. 49 The most advanced Association Agreements allowed the associated partners to benefit from some of the advantages deriving from the Treaties 50 by offering countries the prospect of full integration into the EU. 51 Over time, many FTAs signed by the EU have achieved a deeper integration and generated a permanent dynamism within the group of EU FTAs.
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For example, every enlargement of the EU diminishes this group 53 Development Agreements to support economic development and poverty reduction in third countries. 55 In both cases trade issues are normally included.
All the EU Agreements which are covered in this article have one feature in common; i.e. they are all FTAs. EU FTAs 56 could be just that, but they all include preferences in areas other than trade. This chapter shows that dispute settlement provisions of some EU FTAs reflect identical elements found in political models of dispute settlement of Public International Law and GATT Law. Consequently, it is possible to talk about a political model of dispute settlement in EU FTAs.
The following sections of pre and post WTO EU FTAs show that the quasi-adjudicative DSU did not facilitate the creation of an immediate trend of quasi-adjudicative dispute settlement provisions in EU FTAs.
Pre-WTO EU FTAs (1963 to 1995)
Pre-WTO EU FTAs that contain a political dispute settlement model are the Ankara Agreement, the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Europe Agreements -until accession.
A) THE ANKARA AGREEMENT The Ankara Agreement, signed in Ankara in 1963, is the Association Agreement between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey. 57 This Agreement includes an article that regulates the settlement of disputes relating to the application or interpretation of the Agreement. This Article provides that, in the first instance, the Council of Association should settle the dispute. If the parties do not find a solution and they agree, they can use other fora to settle disputes besides the FTA itself, i.e. the Court of Justice of the European Communities or any other Court or Tribunal. Arbitration and compliance proceedings 58 are not considered. The Agreement only mentions and does not specify which necessary measures 59 must be taken to comply with the rulings.
B) EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA The European Economic Area (EEA) is an Agreement that has undergone many changes with regard to the signatory parties. The EEA was signed in 1992 60 by the EC and European Free Trade Association (EFTA). At that time, the members of EFTA were 55 Article 177 ECT. 56 The term FTA is not used in European jargon due to the fact that trade provisions are included in an Agreement that covers other areas, i.e. political and cooperation. 57 31 December 1977 (OJL 361/1) Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, known as "The Ankara Agreement". 58 Article 25 of the "Ankara Agreement". 59 No definition of necessary measures is provided in the text. 60 The Agreement of the European Economic Area was signed on 2 May 1992 (OJ L 1) 03.01.1994. Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 61 Switzerland did not ratify the EEA due to the negative results in its referendum. Consequently, the EEA was modified by the "Adjusting Protocol" in 1993. 62 Then, in 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden acceded to the European Union, a fact that did not generate any alteration in the text of the Agreement. 63 It is possible to settle disputes concerning interpretation and application of provisions of the Agreement, which are identical in substance to corresponding rules of two European Treaties 64 , and the acts adopted in the application of these two Treaties. 65 These disputes should be launched before the Joint Committee. If a solution is not reached, and the Parties agree, the dispute could be sent to the European Court of Justice. 66 73 This is scheduled to take place on January 1st 2007. 74 Despite the fact that most Europe Agreements are no longer in force, they all followed a similar model of dispute settlement. Thus, it is interesting to review the dispute settlement provisions of interpretation and application 75 which are barely regulated in each Agreement.
The authority that, in first instance, settles the disputes with binding decisions is the Association Council which is composed of the Parties. This allows the respondent party to block the decisions. Arbitration is feasible, however, there are two possibilities for the respondent party to block the composition of the panel. The first is that the respondent names the second arbitrator which allows it to delay the composition of the panel or, even worse, halt it. The second is that both conflicting parties must agree to appoint the third arbitrator. Moreover, the decisions of the panel are not binding, there are no compliance procedures and retaliation is through appropriate measures which are not specified (see table 2 ). 71 Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Romania, of the other part, 31.12.94 (OJ L/357). 72 Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Bulgaria, of the other part, 31.12.94 (OJ L/358). 73 In the EUROMED already in force, the subject of dispute settlement is barely regulated and is similar in each Agreement. There are provisions both for the interpretation and the application of the Agreement and also for the Protocol on rules of origin (Protocol A legal provision (Article 104.9) encompasses a set of rules in which the arbitration stage is more detailed than in the EUROMED Agreements. However, the award is not binding, consensus is required to establish the panel 93 , compliance measures are not specified 94 and there is no retaliation procedure. 95 In urgent cases, retaliation could take place only through appropriate measures 96 , even without having previous consultations. 97 Nevertheless, there are some innovations, i.e. more time limits are established 98 , the obligation to establish the working procedures for arbitration 99 and a reasonable period of time to comply (also through consensus). Issues relating to each Party's WTO rights and obligations can be referred to the FTA arbitration proceeding only if the parties agree.
Earlier it was mentioned that weaknesses in the panel procedure are considered as the first cause of difficulties in a dispute settlement system. For this reason this paper will identify and classify the common weaknesses of the EU dispute settlement provisions into different groups. Consequently, due to the political nature of these weaknesses, these groups are considered as elements of the political model of dispute settlement in EU FTAs. These elements are: no final decisions, decision making process under consensus, no preestablished or barely detailed legal stages and unilateral decisions. 
d) Unilateral Decisions
The Parties are allowed to take some unilateral decisions. For example, for retaliation the Parties have the flexibility of taking appropriate measures which, in most cases, should be notified to the Council (i.e. Europe Agreements, SAAs, EUROMED and South Africa). There are two common elements in these three political models of dispute settlement [i.e. Public International Law, GATT (1947 to 1994) and EU FTAs]. Firstly, the resolution that settles the dispute can be made on a non legal basis and, secondly, it is not binding. Consequently, these two elements act as the pillars of any political model of dispute settlement.
In addition to these two elements, more are found in the political models of Public International Trade Law. One of the elements includes the weakness of the requirement of consensus in the decision making process to adopt resolutions. Another element is not having pre-established legal stages or, if they have, they are barely detailed. In addition, in the EU FTAs, the parties can take unilateral decisions, particularly with regard to compliance of recommendations and retaliation. The following table summarizes the three political models of dispute settlement analyzed above. This section contains the key elements which comprise an adjudicative model of Dispute Settlement in Public International Law. This model was reflected in two peaceful dispute settlement means which were stated in the United Nations Charter, Article 33. 101 The adjudicative means for solving disputes are arbitration and judicial settlement.
Briefly recall that both means have particular features which make them different from each other. 102 For example, whereas in arbitration the Parties constitute a panel appointing arbitrators of their own choice, in judicial settlement the Parties rely on pre-established tribunals or courts. 103 Also, in arbitration the procedures are not pre-established because, in the arbitral commitment, the Parties decide on them whereas in the judicial settlement they are already pre-established. 104 Two common elements between them are; first, the decision is binding and second, a third authority intervenes with the Parties' consent to solve the dispute with a decision issued on the basis of law. 105 These two elements compose the adjudicative model in Public International Law (see diagram 3).
Diagram 3. Adjudicative Model of Dispute Settlement in Public International Law
As with the DSU, the above elements have been incorporated between States at either a bilateral or multilateral level in numerous dispute settlement mechanisms.
Adjudicative elements of the quasi-adjudicative model of WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
The DSU encompasses stages in the process of dispute settlement such as consultations 106 , a panel review process 107 and an appellate stage. 108 These last two stages embody the adjudicative nature of the system and will now be analysed.
The panel review process includes detailed rules, procedures and timeframes. 109 The DSU regulates the establishment of the panels (Article 6), their terms of reference (Article 7 Within the DSU are procedures which have been greatly influenced by particular adjudicative elements of arbitration and judicial settlement respectively. Arbitration influenced the panel review process since the adjudicator is appointed by the Parties. However, it cannot be considered arbitration since the Director General has also the possibility to appoint the members of the panel. The same happens with the arbitration that establishes a reasonable period of time for implementing recommendations and rulings.
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If the Parties do not agree on appointing an arbitrator within 10 days, the Director General will appoint one, who until now has been an Appellate Body Member. The arbitration that objects the level of suspension of concessions proposed or the correct follow up of principles or procedures on suspending concessions, is performed by the original panel or by an arbitrator that is designated by the Director General. 111 In this last arbitration the Parties do not designate their adjudicator and thus cannot be considered arbitration. The only pure arbitration is the one stated in the 25.1 of the DSU, as an alternative mean of dispute settlement to the panel process. The judicial settlement influenced the appellate stage since the adjudicator of the decision is a pre-constituted 112 permanent body, giving a quasi-judicial nature to the system. The DSU is also influenced by the common elements found in arbitration and judicial. In the panel review and appellate stage the decisions are binding and the third authority that solves the dispute does it on the basis of law.
The strengths of the panel review procedure have often been considered responsible for the success of the WTO. For the purpose of this article, these strengths are classified into different groups. These groups are considered the elements of the adjudicative part of the quasi-adjudicative model of dispute settlement in the WTO. These elements are: compulsory jurisdiction, final decisions, decision making process under negative consensus and pre-established and detailed legal stages.
a) Compulsory jurisdiction
There is a compulsory jurisdiction of the Dispute Settlement Body for all of the Members. This means that if a Member brings a dispute against another, the respondent Party cannot refuse to be judged by a panel and the Appellate Body. ii) The report of the panel takes a final and definitive nature when it reaches the Appellate Stage and/or is adopted by the Members. 114 The arbitrations contemplated in the DSU (Articles 21.3, 22.6 or 25.1) have in common that their awards cannot be appealed, consequently they are final.
iii) The decisions of the panel and Appellate Body are used as valuable interpretations for future cases.
c) Decision making process under negative consensus
This element encompasses the following strengths, which due to the negative consensus is possible: i) The quasi-automatic adoption of the panel and Appellate Body rulings, making them binding. Consequently, the adjudicative elements (as listed above) form the dispute settlement system of the WTO which, with the consultations stage, is a quasi-adjudicative model. Even though countries have followed their own models of mechanisms for dispute settlement in their FTAs, undoubtedly the DSU marked an important influence towards adjudication for them. At a bilateral level the EU took its first steps towards adjudication with the implementation of a quasi-adjudicative model in the FTA with Mexico.
IV. QUASI-ADJUDICATIVE MODEL OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
Five years after the creation of the DSU, in 2000, the EU signed the first FTA which contained a quasi-adjudicative model of dispute settlement. This FTA was with Mexico, a country which, since it agreed to be part of NAFTA, only had quasi-adjudicative dispute settlement models in its FTAs.
Two EU FTAs with quasi-adjudicative models similar to the DSU
There are only two countries with quasi-adjudicative models of dispute settlement in their FTAs with the EU and they are Mexico and Chile. It has not been straightforward for all EU FTAs to enter into force. This was the case for the EU-Mexico and Chile FTAs which had to pass through an Interim Agreement before they fully implemented trade subjects.
A) MEXICO The EU-Mexico relation was established in two Agreements
117 along with a Final Act signed in 1997. 118 The Global Agreement 119 includes political, economic and trade areas of shared competences of the EC and its Member States. The Interim Agreement (no longer in force) used to cover trade matters of exclusive EC's competences. 120 The The Global Agreement requires the Joint Council to decide on the establishment of a compatible dispute settlement procedure with the WTO. 124 The dispute settlement rules are shaped with detailed rules and specific time frames. It encompasses, the stages of the procedure (consultations plus arbitration), the appointment of arbitrators, the content of the panel reports (interim and final) 125 and how to implement the final report. 126 It also includes rules of procedure 127 and a code conduct 128 for the arbitrators. 117 The first move towards the signature of In order to identify the quasi-adjudicative model within EU FTAs, the strengths of their dispute settlement Titles will be classified into different groups. For the purposes of this article, these groups are considered to be elements of the adjudicative part in the EU FTAs'quasi-adjudicative model of dispute settlement. These elements are: final decisions, decision making process by a third authority and detailed and pre-established procedures.
Before the adjudicative part of this model is explained, the importance of the consultative part in the dispute settlement procedure will be mentioned. The consultations are held by the authority which is formed by the Parties and may settle the dispute in first stage (i.e. The Association Council). This authority issues non binding decisions (i.e. Mexico and Chile FTAs), whereas, in the political models, the decisions taken by the Parties were binding.
a) Resolutions on a legal basis by third authorities
i) The panel is the third authority that adjudicates decisions on a legal basis.
b) Binding Decisions
The decisions are those that: i) Settle the dispute. ii) Determine the conformity of the measures that the loosing Party will take to comply with the ruling (i.e. EU-Mexico FTA). iii) Determine in retaliation whether or not the level of suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification (i.e. EU-Chile FTA). Despite the incorporation of the previously mentioned adjudicative elements in the dispute settlement EU FTAs' provisions, no bilateral cases have yet been launched. Apparently, the incorporation of adjudicative elements has not been a reason to have a bilateral dispute as it was with the GATT. Some weaknesses still exist but they will be analyzed at a later date. choosing two fora to settle the dispute for the same matter. 137 The alternative forum to the panel procedures that are found in this FTA to settle disputes at the second stage is the WTO. 138 In addition, the panel procedures of the FTA will not consider issues relating to each Party's WTO rights and obligations. 139 A further weakness found in this FTA, which similarly occurs in EU dispute settlement political models, is that appropriate measures are also included in the Global Agreement.
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In the FTA with Chile, the possibility of blocking the composition of the panel is an obvious weakness. This occurs because the list of individuals who can serve as arbitrators must be made by consensus through the Association Council. 141 The practice shows that, despite the specific time frame of six months to constitute this list after the FTA enters into force, more than three years have passed and this list has still not been created.
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Although both quasi-adjudicative dispute settlement mechanisms are very similar they have some differences in their provisions. For example, in the choice of forum, transparency, amicus curiae, composition of the panel and in the interim review stage. In addition, some differences are in time frames, implementation of panel reports, compliance procedures and retaliatory measures (refer to table 8). If the Party does not notify the RPT or the award finds that the measures to comply are incompatible with the Agreement, the Party is allowed to suspend benefits (Art. 188.6) The suspension will be in the same sector (Art. 188.7) The complainant will notify the other Party and the Committee the benefits that will be suspended. The defendant could ask for arbitration within 5 days to determine that the level of suspension is similar to the nullification. In the next 45 days the award must be issued (Art. 188.8) The suspension will be temporary until the application of the measure. By request of any of the Parties, the original panel should issue within 45 days an award about the conformity of the measures of execution after the suspension of benefits (Art. 188.9) Cross retaliation Allowed under certain circumstances (Art.
46.7)
Not mentioned
There are two common elements in the adjudicative and quasi-adjudicative models of dispute settlement [i.e. Public International Law, WTO and EU FTAs]. Firstly, the resolution that settles the dispute is made on a legal basis by a third authority and secondly the decisions are binding. Consequently, these two elements act as the pillars of any political model of dispute settlement.
In addition to these two adjudicative elements an additional one was found in the quasiadjudicative models of Public International Trade Law. These models have the element of pre-established and detailed legal stages. Table 9 summarizes the three adjudicative models of dispute settlement analyzed above. 
V. HYBRID MODEL OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN EU AGREEMENTS WITH TRADE ISSUES
Other EU Agreements with trade issues different than FTAs include dispute settlement provisions (as in the case of the Customs Union with Turkey and the Cotonou Agreement).
Here they are reviewed to illustrate a different kind of dispute settlement model that is not purely political or adjudicative. This is the hybrid model where arbitration is included for both political and adjudicative elements.
The EU-South Africa dispute settlement mechanism does not belong to this category despite arbitration being included. Instead, it was considered to have a political model because predominantly its dispute settlement provision is composed of elements from this model. The same criterion, but from the other extreme, was used with the EU-Chile FTA that includes the possibility of blocking the establishment of the panel. It was considered to have a quasi-adjudicative model, and not a hybrid, since its dispute settlement mechanism is also mostly composed of elements from this model.
A) CUSTOMS UNION WITH TURKEY
The Customs Union 143 with Turkey came into force in 1995 144 as a further phase of the FTA established in the Ankara Agreement. All except two issues of the provision to solve disputes of the Ankara Agreement were incorporated in this Customs Union. Consensus was required in the rules for arbitration or to initiate a judicial procedure. Instead, the Customs Union makes the award binding 145 although the panel could be composed only through consensus. Thus, the blockage possibility is still there 146 and no retaliation procedures were established either. Due to the two previous weaknesses, it can only be considered as a first approach of a dispute settlement adjudicative model in EU FTAs (see diagram 3). 
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Its mechanism for the settlement of disputes 151 is innovative, i.e. the option for a multiparty dispute is incorporated, arbitration is possible after consultations where the second and/or third arbitrator is not designated by the defendant party, either party can ask the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to appoint one. However, the award is not binding, there are no rules for compliance and retaliation could be taken through appropriate measures. 
VI. EU FTAs NOT YET IN FORCE: WHAT WILL BE THE TREND FOR FUTURE EU FTAs?
The EU is still negotiating FTAs all over the world. Negotiations are currently in progress with MERCOSUR (Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This is also the case with the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAS), and with the updating of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements (negotiations on agriculture, services, investments and dispute settlement). 148 The 
B) GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is made up of six Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman. In 1998 they signed a Cooperation Agreement which covered economic and cooperation activities. Based on this, the Commission is now negotiating a FTA with the GCC which not only includes goods but also services, government procurement and intellectual property rights. 154 These Agreements are being negotiated between the EU and the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries (6 regions with 76 countries). 155 In 2008, reciprocal preferences for trade will begin under the results of the current negotiations.
D) UPDATE OF EURO-MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENTS
Update of Euro Mediterranean Agreements. Under the current Mediterranean Agreements, both parties are currently increasing negotiations on agriculture, services and investments. These negotiations are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy which also includes new rules of dispute settlement.
CONCLUSION
The outcome of a negotiation relies exclusively on the signatory Parties involved in the Agreement. After reviewing the different models of dispute settlement (political, quasiadjudicative and hybrid) that the EU has incorporated for over 40 years into both its FTAs and agreements with trade issues, some conclusions can be made regarding future trends in EU FTAs.
It is coherent that if throughout the history of the GATT dispute settlement, the EU was the main opponent of including adjudicative elements and, during the same period, all its FTAs contained political elements. However, the EU kept the same policy of not incorporating adjudicative elements in its bilateral trade relations since the WTO dispute settlement system was born. Surprisingly, the EU adopted and continues to adopt, this policy despite being the second biggest player and having more than ten years of DSU experience.
Perhaps, for these historical reasons, the EU is still trying to prove that its multilateral dispute settlement position during the GATT DSU negotiations works even at a bilateral level.
It is evident that the EU has not followed a clear trend towards a quasi-adjudicative model like the one of the DSU. This is illustrated by the establishment and entering into force of more Post-WTO FTAs with political models of dispute settlement than FTAs with quasiadjudicative or hybrid dispute settlement models. The Post-WTO FTAs with political models were established with Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Bosnia & Herzegovina plus Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestinian Authority, Algeria and South Africa. Post-WTO FTAs with quasi-adjudicative models were only established with Mexico and Chile. The hybrid model was found only in Agreements with trade issues and at different levels of economic integration than FTAs. It is possible, however, that it can be incorporated into FTAs as well.
The EU incorporated political models in its FTAs before, during and after the WTO dispute settlement system was created. Consequently, it appears highly possible that the incorporation into FTAs of any of the three models examined in this paper will constitute a trend to be followed. A trend that gives the quasi-adjudicative model of dispute settlement no more importance than the others and treats it as just another model. This article highlights that, despite there being three models of dispute settlement in the EU Agreements, none have ever been used. There has not been a single dispute under any of the studied Agreements. One reason for this could be that there was an absence of adjudicative elements in certain FTAs. This was the explanation for the GATT's lack of cases between 1947 and 1994. However, since 2000 and 2002 with the EU Mexico and Chile FTAs respectively, the EU has introduced adjudicative elements into its dispute settlement provisions and still no disputes have been launched. Consequently, it is important to review the rules that are included in the quasi-adjudicative model of EU FTAs.
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